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CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE: ENSURING THE
VIABILITY OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY WHILE
PROTECTING THE INVESTOR
KEVIN W. WEIGAND*
INTRODUCTION
As the United States economy encountered financial crisis in the
fall of 2008,1 federal lawmakers on both sides of the aisle demanded in-
creased regulation of banks and financial institutions.2 Citing corporate
greed, excess, and deregulation as causes of the financial meltdown, many
influential leaders argued that the proper solution was greater oversight of
Wall Street.3 In an effort to promote greater accountability, John
McCain, the Republican Party nominee for the 2008 Presidential election,
called for the dismissal of Christopher Cox, the Chairman of the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission ("SEC").4 McCain accused him of betraying
the trust of the public and maintaining "trading rules that let speculators
and hedge funds turn our markets into a casino."5
Although the push for increased regulation did not suddenly arise
following the onset of the financial crisis,6 the country's economic downturn
. J.D. candidate, 2010,William & Mary School of Law. B.S. Political Science and Criminal
Justice, Northeastern University, 2007. I would like to extend my gratitude to the staff
and Editorial Board of the William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, as
well as all those who provided invaluable feedback and encouragement throughout the pub-
lication process. I would also like to thank my friends and family for their constant support.
1 See Alexandra Twin, Stocks Crushed: Approximately $1.2 Trillion in Market Value is
Gone after the House Rejects the $700 Billion Bank Bailout Plan, CNN, Sept. 29, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/29/markets/markets-newyork/index.htm.
2 See Phil Izzo, Economists Expect Crisis to Deepen, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2008, at A6; Justin
Lahart, World Economy Shows New Strain, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2008, at Al; Greg Hitt,
Democrats Mull $300 Billion Stimulus, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15,2008, at A3, available at http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB122402768546534409.html; Kara Scannell, Rescue Plan Stirs
Calls for Deeper Regulation, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2008, at Al, available at http://online
.wsj.com/article/SB122221359440869183.html.
s See, e.g., Excerpts from the Second Presidential Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at A20.
4 Vikas Bajaj & Graham Bowley, A Bid to Curve Profit Gambit as Banks Fail, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2008, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/19/business/
19backlash.html?fta-y.
Id.
6 Stephen Grocer, Timeline: Two Years in the Credit Crisis, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Sept. 16,
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has significantly increased the likelihood of greater attention and passage
of legislation geared toward an increase in oversight and transparency.'
Over the past few years, the SEC has handled a substantial escalation in
shareholder initiatives aimed at increasing the oversight of financial insti-
tutions and providing more information to investors.8 One area of particular
interest to the Commission has been climate change? Increasingly wary
over its potential impacts on a company's reputation, solvency and profit-
ability, the SEC has faced mounting pressure to require publicly traded
companies to disclose information related to climate change's financial im-
pact on their operations and viability.1 ° During the 2008 proxy season, law-
makers filed a record number of climate-related shareholder resolutions,1'
most demanding greater information regarding how climate change af-
fects the companies. 2 Recognizing the increased concern over this issue,
Congress has made efforts to require publicly traded companies to inform
securities investors of the risks relating to "the potential ... impacts of
global warming on the interests of the issuer."'3 Although such legislative
initiatives have not been successful thus far,'4 the push for increased
disclosure is unlikely to subside in the near future.
2009,12:30 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/09/16/timeline-two-years-in-the-credit-crisis/
(noting that the financial market experienced symptoms of crisis as early as mid 2007,
but it wasn't until a year later that the government moved to impose increased regulation
on the financial market).
' See Fed Chief Angered by AIG Rescue, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 4, 2009, at A8.
8 Thomas Kostigen, SEC Urged to Act on Climate-Change Rules, MARKETWATCH, July 24,
2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sec-should-adopt-disclosure-rules-on-climate-risk.
' Peter L. Gray, The SEC Is Getting Hot and Bothered Over Climate Change, METRO.
CORP. COUNS., Jan. 2008, at 11, 11, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/
2008/January/11.pdf.
"0 Id.; Investors Call on SEC to Enforce Climate Change Disclosures, ENVTL. LEADER,
June 16,2009, http://www.environmentalleader.com/2009/06/16/investors-call-on-sec-to
-enforce-climate-change-disclosures.
'" CERES & ENVTL. DEF. FUND, CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS: AN ANALYSIS
OF 10-K REPORTING BY OIL AND GAS, INSURANCE, COAL, TRANSPORTATION AND ELECTRIC
POWER COMPANIES 7 (2009), available at http://www.ceres.org/Document.Doc?id=473
[hereinafter CERES CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE REPORT].
1 Jacqueline Bell, Pressure Grows To Disclose Global Warming Risks, LAW360, Sept. 10,
2008, http://www.law360.com/articles/67827.
" See Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S.485, 110th Cong. (2007); Global Warming
Pollution Reduction Act, S.309, 110th Cong. (2007).
14 Matthew H. Ahrens, Should We Tell Our Shareholders about Climate Change?, IN-
HOUSE COUN. COMMITTEE NEWSL. (A.B.A. SEC. ENV'T, ENERGY, & RESOURCES), June 2009,
at 10, 12, available at http://www.abanet.org/enviror/committees/counsel/newsletter/jun09/
InHouseCounselJuneO9.pdf.
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Insurance companies are particularly concerned about climate
change. A 2008 study conducted by Ernst & Young examined the top ten
strategic business risks facing the insurance industry and found that
climate change is the biggest threat to the industry. 5 This is largely due
to the wide range of potential consequences faced, such as "windstorms,
flood and heat waves.., increases in mortality and health problems, the
spread of environmentally related litigation, political risk linked to con-
flicts for control of resources, and effects on capital markets."'6 Not sur-
prisingly, many consumer groups are advocating increased disclosure by
the insurance industry by demanding that companies detail the risks they
face as a result of climate change.' 7
Insurers are wary of increased disclosure requirements for nu-
merous reasons.' 8 Insurers are concerned about the level of uncertainty
regarding the ability to accurately predict future risk resulting from cli-
mate change, the effect of disclosure on premiums, and the potential for
increased litigation following disclosure. 9 Insurers are also worried about
the potential revelation of proprietary information in disclosure reports."°
Given the fact that the insurance industry earns profits based on accurate
calculation of risk, many companies fear that new regulations will require
them to disclose trade secrets that will decrease competitive advantages
and hamper profitability.2'
This note will discuss current disclosure requirements and pro-
posed legislation aimed at requiring companies to disclose information
related to the financial risks of climate change to shareholders. It will then
analyze the proposals' potential impacts by focusing on the benefits and
risks of disclosure to insurers, as well as the effects on policyholders who
may consequently face changes in the availability or affordability of cov-
erage. This note will also discuss potential alternatives that might better
address the concerns of both insurers and policyholders. Finally, it will
15 ERNST&YOUNG, STRATEGIc BUSINESS RISK2008: INSURANCE 4 (2008), available at http:I
www.ey.com/PublicationvwLUAssets/Industry-Insurance-StrategicBusinessRisk-2008/
$FILEflndustryInsuranceStrategicBusinessRisk_2008.pdf.
'6 Id. at 6.
17 See, e.g., Ceres, Insurance Sector, http://www.ceres.org//Page.aspx?pid=760 (last visited
Nov. 11, 2009) ("Ceres is seeking improved disclosure by insurers on their exposure to
climate risk. This will help focus the attention of the industry, as well as the financial
markets, on the magnitude of the risk and the need to work toward solutions.").
18 See infra Part II.B.1.
19 See infra Part II.B.1.
20 See infra text accompanying notes 152-57.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 143-47.
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conclude by discussing mitigation techniques that insurance companies
can utilize in order to reduce financial risks of climate change, as well as
what steps other companies can take to provide greater information to
shareholders. This note will provide a recommendation that balances the
concerns of the insurance industry by creating carefully tailored disclo-
sure requirements that preserve proprietary information while providing
adequate information for both consumers and investors to properly guide
their business decisions.
I. DISCLOSURE AND REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
A. Current SEC Regulations
The SEC has promulgated numerous rules and reporting require-
ments for publicly traded companies." Some public interest groups and
consumer advocates argue that these regulations already mandate com-
panies to report information regarding climate change's impact on their
financial well-being.2" The requirements that may have particular appli-
cation to climate change disclosure are Regulations S-K 101, 103, and 303.
S-K 101 requires publicly traded companies to describe the nature
of their business and discuss "the material effects that compliance with
Federal, State and local provisions.., regulating the discharge of mate-
rials into the environment, or otherwise relating to the protection of the
environment, may have upon the capital expenditures, earnings and com-
petitive position of the registrant and its subsidiaries."24 This regulation
may draw even more attention given the House of Representatives' recent
passage of a "landmark climate change bill"25 in June of 2009, which would
require large American companies to reduce their carbon dioxide emis-
sions, as well as other greenhouse gases.26
Regulation S-K 103 requires a company to explain any "material
pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary routine litigation incidental
22 MICHELLE CHAN-FISHEL, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, FIFTH SURVEY OF CLIMATE CHANGE
DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS OF AUTOMOBILE, INSURANCE, OIL & GAS, PETROCHEMICAL,
AND UTILITIES COMPANIES 6 (2006), available at http://www.foe.org/camps/intl/SECFinal
ReportandAppendices.pdf.
23 Id. at 6-7; Marie Leone, Will the SEC Go Green?, CFO.COM, Sept. 19, 2007, http:/
www.cfo.com/article.cfm/9826963/c_10007226.
24 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c) (1) (xi) (2008) (emphasis added).
25 Richard Cowan, House Passes Landmark Climate Change Bill, REUTERS, June 27,
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE5504R120090626.2 American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted).
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to the business," where the company or a subsidiary of the company is a
party.2" Although courts have not been heavily involved in climate change
litigation thus far,28 some are beginning to address lawsuits examining
whether private organizations and the insurance companies that repre-
sent them can be held liable for contributing to climate change due to their
emissions of greenhouse gases.29 In fact, a recent report issued by Swiss Re,
a leading insurer in Switzerland, predicted a flood of climate change liti-
gation in the near future, concluding that "[w]e expect... climate change-
related liability will develop more quickly than asbestos-related claims,
and believe the frequency and sustainability of climate-related litigation
could become a significant issue within the next couple of years."3 In such
an event, S-K 103 may become increasingly applicable as well.
SEC Regulation S-K 303 has received the most attention from
those advocating for increased disclosure." Included within the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, S-K 303 requires the disclosure of "any known trends
or uncertainties" that are reasonably expected to have a material effect
on a company's operations, as well as any information that would help a
shareholder understand a company's financial condition and any changes
to that condition.
Each of these regulations includes a standard of materiality for
requiring disclosure. In TSC Industries v. Northway the Supreme Court
provided guidance by defining the standard for materiality as a question
of law and fact, stating that a "fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote. 34 The Court elaborated that the standard does not
require a showing of a "substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted
fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. What
[it] does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under
27 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2008) (emphasis added).
2 Mark E. Ruquet, Climate Change Litigation Set to Explode, Creating Opportunities,
Perils for Insurers, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, July 27, 2009, at 14, 14, avail-
able at http://www.property-casualty.com/Issues/2009/July-27-2009/Pages/Climate-
Change-Litigation-Set-To-Explode-Creating-Opportunities-Perils-For-Insurers.aspx.
29 Id. at 14, 17.
30 Id. at 14.
21 Gray, supra note 9, at 11; SANFORD LEWIS, INVESTOR ENvTL. HEALTH NETWORK,
BRIDGING THE CREDIBILITY GAP: EIGHT CORPORATE LIABILITY ACCOUNTING LOOPHOLES
THAT REGULATORS MUST CLOSE 25 (2009), available at http://www.iehn.org/documents/
EightLoopholes.pdf.
32 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (2) (ii) (2008) (emphasis added).
33 TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
34 Id. at 449.
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all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual signifi-
cance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. 35
Legislators have sought to include disclosure of financial risks from
climate change on Form 10-K quarterly reports as a requirement within
the disclosure requirements of Regulation S-K 303. For example, two pieces
of legislation were introduced in Congress in 2007 to accomplish this goal.36
Introduced by Senator Bernie Standards of Vermont, the Global Warming
Pollution Reduction Act would have compelled the SEC to promulgate
requirements for "corporate environmental disclosure of climate change
risks."3 The Act included regulations directing issuers of stock to "inform
securities investors of... 1) the financial exposure of the issuer because
of the net global warming emissions of the issuer; and 2) the potential eco-
nomic impacts of global warming on the interests of the issuer."3 To make
it clear that this disclosure would fall within the requirements of S-K 303
and must therefore be provided on Form 10-K, the Act specifically stated
that "global warming constitutes a known trend."39
Two weeks after the Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act
was introduced, Senators John Kerry and Olympia Snowe introduced the
Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007.40 The language of Section 302 of
the bill, related to corporate disclosure, is very similar to the Global Warm-
ing Pollution Reduction Act.4 The Kerry-Snowe bill also contains language
declaring climate change to be a "known trend. 42 Both bills were referred
to Senate committees but saw no movement to the floor for a vote.43
B. Roadblocks to Regulation
It is not always clear how the SEC's reporting requirements should
be interpreted with regard to disclosure, specifically in relation to what
35 Id.
36 See Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S. 309, 110th Cong. (2007); Global
Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S. 485, 110th Cong. (2007).
37 S. 309 § 9.
'
8 Id. § 9(a).
9 Id. § 9(c) (1) (B).
40 S. 485 § 302.
41 Compare S. 485 § 302, with S. 309 § 9 (both bills require disclosure of the financial and
economic impacts of emissions and global warming).
42 S. 485 § 302(c) (1) (B).43 THOMAS, Library of Congress, Legislative History of Senate Bill 309, http://thomas.loc
.gov/cgi-binlbdquery/z?dllO:s.00309: (last visited Nov. 11, 2009); THOMAS, Library of
Congress, Legislative History of Senate Bill 485, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binfbdquery/
z?dllO:s.00485: (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
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factors a company should consider when calculating risk.44 S-K 303, and
the Supreme Court interpretations of standards for materiality, provide
general guidance, but there remains a lack of clear standards that specify
exactly what information companies must disclose.45 Part of this is due
to disagreement over the nature and severity of climate change,46 thereby
creating variances in opinion as to whether or not climate change itself
constitutes a material effect on a company's operations.
1. The Politics of Climate Change
Climate change issues have become very political, which complicates
efforts to achieve consensus.47 For example, Nobel Prize winner and former
Vice President Al Gore proclaimed that "[t]he debate is over! There's no
longer any debate in the scientific community about [climate change] ."48
However, more than 32,000 scientists from around the world, 9,000 of
whom possess a Ph.D., recently joined together in a statement disagreeing
with "alarmist assertions" adopting climate change.49 Similarly, in 2006,
United States Senator James Inhofe stated in a speech on the Senate floor
that the "greatest climate threat we face may be coming from alarmist
computer models."5 More recently, a 2009 Gallup poll found that forty-
one percent of Americans believe the seriousness of global warming is
"exaggerated" in the news.' These disagreements and political disputes
44 Bell, supra note 12, at 3.
45 Id.46 See, e.g., Cornelia Dean, Will Warming Lead to aRise in Hurricanes?, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/O5/29/science/earth/29hurr.html?r=l
(discussing global warming's effect, if any, on the severity and frequency of hurricanes).
4 See Dan Shapley, The Republican-Democratic Split on Global Warming, DAILY GREEN,
Sept. 28, 2007, http://www.thedailygreen.com/environmental-news/latest/7313.
4 Jonathan Freeland, BornAgain, GUARDIAN, May 31, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
film/2006/may/31I/usa.environment.
" 32,000 Scientists Dissent from Global Warming "Consensus," ASS'N OF AM. PHYSICIANS
AND SURGEONS, May 20, 2008, http://www.aapsonline.org/newsoftheday/0026.
50 Zachary Coile, Senator Fights the Tide, Calls Warming by Humans a Hoax, SAN
FRANcIsco CHRON., Oct. 11, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article
.cgi?file=/c/a/2006/10/11JMNGEJLMT8A1.DTL (noting Inhofe referred to global warming
as "'the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people."').
51 Lydia Saad, Increased Number Think Global Warming is Exaggerated, GALLUP,
Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/polYl16590/increased-number-think-global-warming
-exaggerated.aspx#l.
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may have also led to reluctance on the part of courts to address climate
change issues thus far.52
Although disagreement remains regarding the effects and extent
to which humans are accelerating climate change, most politicians and
other government officials are still taking the issue very seriously. The
United Nations established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, which, in 2007, released its Fourth Assessment Report examin-
ing the causes of climate change and its projected effects.53 Meanwhile,
a June 2009 report detailing a government study begun during the Bush
administration warned of the severe impacts of climate change on health,
agriculture, energy supply, water resources, ecosystems, and other aspects
of society.54 Some military and intelligence analysts are also concerned
about the threat of climate-induced crises such as "violent storms, drought,
mass migration, and pandemics" on national security.55 Finally, in a joint
press release in 2007, Independent Joe Lieberman and Republican Susan
Collins, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, warned of the "dire eco-
nomic consequences" of global warming on the country." Although it re-
mains to be seen whether consensus can be reached on the proper solution
to this worldwide issue, most governmental actors agree that climate
change is at least having discernible effects.57
52 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F.Supp.2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding
that a public nuisance suit seeking a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions raised a
political question impossible to decide without an "initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion. .. ").
53See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS
REPORT 26,29-33 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/
ar4_syr.pdf. The report stated that "[m]ost of the observed increase in global average
temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in
anthropogenic [greenhouse gas] concentrations." Id. at 39 (emphasis in original).
54 See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 9-12 (2009), available at http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/
pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf; John M. Broder, Government Study Warns of Climate
Change Effects, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
06/16/science/earth/16climate.html.
" John M. Broder, Climate Change Seen as Threat to U.S. Security, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/science/earth/O9cimate.html?scp=
1&sq=Climtae%20change&st=cse.
" Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, Senators
Lieberman and Collins Warn of 'Dire Economic Consequences" of Global Warming for
Insurers, Taxpayers, the Nation (Apr. 19, 2007), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/ (click
"press"; click "2007"; then scroll to "4/19/07").
" See John Houghton, Madrid 1995: Diagnosing Climate Change, NATURE, October 9,
2008, at 737-38, available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v455/n7214/pdf/455737a
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2. Uncertainties Regarding Disclosure Obligations
Lack of consensus on the magnitude and severity of climate change
could be making it difficult for companies to predict its financial effects on
their operations.58 Courts, however, have not been silent on how compa-
nies should address uncertainties in disclosure. In 1992, the SEC exam-
ined disclosure of financial uncertainties and forward-looking statements
in In re Caterpillar.59 In Caterpillar, the company's management team
faced difficulties predicting future performance due to unexpected profits
from the previous year and concerns regarding whether it would be able
to achieve the same success.6" Due to these uncertainties, Caterpillar's
forward-looking financial information was not disclosed in Form 10-K,
leading the SEC to investigate whether such disclosure was optional, or
whether the reporting failure violated Regulation S-K 303.61 The SEC
concluded that this lack of disclosure "left investors with an incomplete
picture of Caterpillar's financial condition and results of operations." 2
.pdf (noting the countries debated and finally decided on "the balance of evidence suggests
a discernible human influence on climate change.").
5 Insurance Sector Concerned by Climate Change Financial Impact, http://www.business
spectator.com.aulbs.nsf/Article/Insurance-sector-irked-by-climate-change-W59TQ
?opendocument&src--rss (last visited Nov. 11, 2009) (concluding that insurance
companies want to be better educated about climate change before discussing climate
change risk coverage).
9In re Caterpillar, Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, 50 SEC Docket 903, 907-12 (Mar. 31,
1992).60 Id. at 905.
61 Id. at 909-12. The SEC explained the differences between "required disclosure" and
"optional forward-looking disclosure" when preparing a Form 10-K, including how such
differences affect reporting requirements:
Both required disclosure regarding the future impact of presently
known trends, events or uncertainties and optional forward-looking
information may involve some prediction or projection. The distinction
between the two rests with the nature of the prediction required. Re-
quired disclosure is based on currently known trends, events, and un-
certainties that are reasonably expected to have material effects.... In
contrast, optional forward-looking disclosure involves anticipating a
future trend or event or anticipating a less predictable impact of a
known event, trend or uncertainty.
Id. at 910.
6 2Id. The Commission followed the test created to assess whether disclosure is required.
As to prospective information, the MD & A Release sets forth the
following test for determining when disclosure is required:
Where a trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is known,
management must make two assessments:
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The Commission found Caterpillar violated the Exchange Act and ordered
the company to develop and maintain procedures in accordance with the
requirements of S-K 303.3
Following the Caterpillar ruling, companies simply did not know
whether, and to what extent, climate change risks needed to be disclosed
to avoid increased litigation and fines from the SEC.64 To alleviate such
concerns, Congress enacted legislation creating safeguards protecting in-
accurate disclosure. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,6
for example, provides liability protection from "forward-looking statements"
as long as the statement is "accompanied by meaningful cautionary state-
ments identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ
materially from those in the forward-looking statement."' Consequently,
given the lack of consensus surrounding the effects of climate change, com-
panies required to disclose information may still be protected by providing
a disclaimer concerning the potential for inaccuracies in their predictions. 7
C. Increased Pressure to Disclose
Despite a lack of clarity related to disclosure requirements and
confusion over what information must be disclosed, there is increased pres-
sure on companies to disclose whatever information they do possess on
climate change's operational effects.' Though reluctant at first, some com-
panies have gradually made efforts to voluntarily disclose the financial
(1) Is the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty likely
to come to fruition? If management determines that it is not reasonably
likely to occur, no disclosure is required.
(2) If management cannot make that determination, it must evaluate
objectively the consequences of the known trend, demand, commitment,
event or uncertainty, on the assumption that it will come to fruition.
Disclosure is then required unless management determines that a
material effect on the registrhnt's financial condition or results of
operations is not reasonably likely to occur.
Id.
63 Id. at 913.
64 SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, DISCLOSURE OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISK IN SEC
FILINGS 1-2 (2008), http://www.stblaw.com/content/publications/pub780.pdf.
6 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
6 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (1) (a) (i) (2006).
67 See id.
6 Peyton Fleming, Investors Achieve Major Company Commitments on Climate Change,
CERES, Aug. 20, 2008, available at http://www.ceres.org/Page.aspx?pid=928&srcid=705;
SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 64, at 2.
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risks of climate change they face. 9 Given their high levels of carbon emis-
sions, it is not surprising that energy companies have been at the fore-
front of this initiative, likely resulting from a desire to avoid the negative
consequences and litigation that might otherwise result.7v
Recent efforts to mandate disclosure have been successful. In 2007,
New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo issued subpoenas seeking to
determine the level of public knowledge surrounding the financial risks
to five New York energy companies that would accompany the proposed
building of coal-fired power plants in the state.71 Letters accompanying
the subpoenas questioned whether investors received adequate informa-
tion concerning financial liabilities associated with the resulting carbon
emissions' effects on climate change."
In an agreement with Cuomo in August 2008, Xcel Energy became
the first energy company to enter into an enforceable agreement to
publicly disclose financial liabilities resulting from climate change.73 Xcel
also agreed to disclose "material financial risks" associated with climate
change, such as drought or rising sea levels.74 Two months later, Dynegy
also reached an agreement with Cuomo to disclose such "material risks." 5
Although energy companies are the largest greenhouse gas emitters, some
69Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, The Legal Ramifications of Climate Change on Business,
ENVTL. L. BULLETIN, Spring 2008, at 1, 3, available at http://www.weil.comlfiles/upload
EnvironmentalLawbulletin-spring2008.pdf.
70 Id. (citing specific energy companies).
7' Felicity Barringer & Danny Hakim, New York Subpoenas 5 Energy Companies, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, at A31, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/nyregion
16greenhouse.html. The five energy companies included AES Corporation, Dominion,
Dynegy, Peabody Energy and Xcel Energy. Id.
72 Id.
71 See Nicholas Confessore, Energy Firm to Specify Investor Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,
2008, at C1.74 Id.
7' Daniel Edward Rosen, Power Company to Cue Investors, NEWSDAY, Oct. 24, 2008,
available at http://www.newsday.com/business/tehmology/power-company-to-cue-investors- 1
.765391. Significant aspects of the agreement included the following: an analysis of finan-
cial risks associated with future greenhouse gas legislation and regulations; descriptions
of litigation and court decisions that may impact the company; levels of emissions of green-
house gases and strategies to reduce emissions; the extent, if any, to which"'environmental
performance factors' are incorporated into officer compensation;" and "the impact of an
increase in sea level and changes in weather conditions." John Horan, Dynegy Inc. Agrees
with New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo to Disclose Material Risks Related to
Climate Change, GLOBAL CLIMATE L. BLOG (Oct. 27, 2008), http://www.globalclimatelaw
.com/2008/10/articles/securities-disclosure/dynegy-inc-agrees-with-new-york-attorney
-general-andrew-cuomo-to-disclose-material-risks-related-to-climate-change/.
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speculate that this pressure to disclose will soon expand to other industries
facing similar pressure.7"
On the federal level, the SEC has come under heavy criticism for
its role in the economic collapse and its failure to pursue regulatory en-
forcement actions adequately, leading critics to believe that "the agency
is in as much turmoil as the markets it polices."" Most notably, the SEC
faced a crushing blow to its reputation when it failed to discover a Ponzi
scheme run by billionaire Bernard Madoff that defrauded investors of
approximately $50 billion, despite numerous tips and investigations.7"
Upon assuming her position as the Commission's new chairman in 2009,
Mary Schapiro promised increased enforcement measures and less bureau-
cratic red tape, stating that "[t]hose who break the law and take advantage
of investors need to know that they will face an unrelenting law enforce-
ment agency in the SEC .... [Enforcement] is, and always will remain,
a foundation of our mission."79
Regulatory and law enforcement agencies are not the only groups
pressing for increased disclosure. Investors are equally, if not more, con-
cerned, and continue to push for more transparency. In 2008, sixty-seven
shareholder proposals related to climate change were filed with U.S. and
Canadian companies.' This record number of proposals resulted in nearly
half of those companies making positive commitments to address the cli-
mate change issue, leading to a withdrawal of the shareholder proposal."'
Those allowing the proposals to go to a shareholder vote also saw substan-
tial support.8 2 Groups like Ceres, a network of investors, environmental
organizations, and other public interest groups, have also been outspoken
" Seth Kerschner, Power Companies Agree to Expanded Disclosure of Climate Change
Risk in Landmark Settlements with New York Attorney General, ENVTL. DISCLOSURE
COMMITTEE NEWSL. (A.B.A. SEC. ENV'T, ENERGY, & RESOURCES), Mar. 2009, at 2, 4-5,
available at http://www.abanet.org/environ/committees/environdisclosures/newsletter/
marO9/EnvDiscl Mar09.pdf (suggesting that the Xcel settlements could provide a precedent
for many other public companies).
" The Securities and Exchange Commission: Growing Insecurities, ECONOMIST, Jan. 17,
2009, at 73 ("[T]he SEC is fighting to justify its existence. It is unlikely to be unscathed
by the planned regulatory overhaul under Barack Obama.").
7 ZacharyA. Goldfarb, New SEC ChiefMoves to Toughen Enforcement, WASH. POST, Feb. 7,
2009, at D2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/
06/AR2009020602876.html.
79 id.
80 CERES CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE REPORT, supra note 11, at 7.
81 Id.
82 Id. ('The average vote for resolutions.., increased from 18.4% in 2006 to 22% in 2007.
In 2008... reports averaged 30.6% support.").
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in their efforts to promote greater transparency, calling for the SEC to
require all companies to disclose "[s]trategic analyses of climate risks
and emissions management plans .. .[a]ssessments of physical risks
related to climate change... [and] [a]nalyses of regulatory risks related
to climate change." 3
Given the public demand for increased oversight of business indus-
tries and the mounting pressure on the SEC to increase its enforcement
activity, it would not be surprising to see strict disclosure laws put into
place in the near future.
II. CLIMATE CHANGE'S IMPACT ON THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
The insurance industry is imperiled by the potential effects of
climate change, due particularly to the nature of its business in insuring
risk.' Insurance companies examine individual rates of loss for various
types of risk and provide financial protection for these risks based on the
likelihood of the insured risk occurring." Most insurance policies are pro-
vided by private insurers.8 6 High-risk groups, such as those who have filed
many claims, or live or conduct business in a particular area that is prone
to increased risk of a claim, however, are often unable to obtain insurance
in the private market and instead receive coverage from the public sector
through state insurance programs and funds.8 7 If insurers attempt to re-
duce their exposure or exit high-risk areas, the public sector is often forced
to shoulder the burden by insuring these high-risk groups.88
A 2007 Government Accountability Office report concluded that
both private and public insurers are likely to face increased exposure to
83 Meg Wilcox, Ceres Applauds EPA Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule; Renews Call on SEC
to Require Mandatory Climate Risk Disclosure in Securities Filings, CERES, Mar. 10, 2009,
available at http://www.ceres.org/Page.aspx?pid=1058.
84 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL RISKS TO FEDERAL AND PRIVATE
INSURERS IN COMING DECADES ARE POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT: REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE
ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE 1-9 (2007) available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07285.pdf [hereinafter GAO INSURERREPORT] (a report
analyzing the financial effects of climate change and other weather-related losses on the
insurance industry).85 NILS GILMAN, DOUG RANDALL, & PETER SCHWARTZ, GLOBAL Bus. NETWORK, IMPACTS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE: A SYSTEM VULNERABILITY APPROACH TO CONSIDER THE POTENTIAL
IMPACTS TO 2050 OF A MID-UPPER GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS SCENARIO 13 (2007),
available at http://www.gbn.com/articles/pdfs/GBNImpacts%20of/20Climate%2OChange
_whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE].86id.
87 Id.
88 GAO INSURER REPORT, supra note 84, at 33.
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claims as a result of climate change. 9 In contrast to nearly all other types
of business, insurers are unable to precisely discern most of the expenses
for their policies when providing coverage.9" As a result, it is difficult to
accurately assess vulnerability in order to evaluate how to properly spread
the risk.9 '
Insurers traditionally calculate costs of coverage related to par-
ticular disasters, such as hurricanes, based on historical data and past
events.92 Climate change, however, alters this level of predictability.93
Additionally, if a particular weather-related event occurs more frequently
in one particular area-New Orleans being hit by three consecutive hur-
ricanes with the same strength as Hurricane Katrina, for example-the
insurer may no longer wish to assume the risk and choose to stop provid-
ing coverage to that particular area.94 State insurance pools would then
be forced to shoulder the burden of providing coverage to an even greater
amount of high-risk groups.9"
The effect on the insurance industry from Hurricane Katrina pro-
vides a warning of the potential impacts of long-term climate change re-
sulting from similar, more frequent, weather-related issues. According
to the Insurance Information Institute, Hurricane Katrina caused approxi-
mately $40.6 billion in insured damage. 96 This represented the largest loss
in the history of the industry.9" Although one may believe that the disclo-
sure of risk and insurance premiums that accurately reflect the level of
risk will lead people to relocate to areas with less of a threatened impact,
history has shown this is not the case.9" In fact, coastal populations, which
"9 IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 85, at 14.
9 M. ACAD. OFACTUARIES, CATASTROPHE MGMT. WORK GROUP, CATASTROPHE EXPOSURES
AND INSURANCE INDUSTRY CATASTROPHE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 10 (2001), available
at http://www.actuary.org/pdf/casualty/catastropheO61001.pdf [hereinafter CATASTROPHE
ExPOsURES].
91 Id. at 6 (stating that "[f]uture insurance losses must be estimated.").
92 Id. at 10-11.
93 GAO INSURER REPORT, supra note 84, at 8 (noting that climate change may affect the
weather-related events). If the historical data is no longer predictable, it may cause prob-
lems for insurance companies. CATASTROPHE ExPOSURES, supra note 90, at 11 (discussing
the flaws with using historical data to predict future policy periods).
94 CATASTROPHE EXPOSURES, supra note 90, at 13.95 Id. at 20.
96 Press Release, Ins. Info. Inst., Hurricane Katrina and Insurance: Two Years Later
(Aug. 27, 2007), available at http://www.iii.org/media/updates/press.775235/.
9 7 
Id.
9 See, e.g., Kelley M. Jancaitis, Florida on the Coast of Climate Change: Responding to
Rising Seas, 31 ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L. & POLY J. 157, 191 (2008) (discussing the growth in
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represent particularly high-risk areas, are expected to increase in the
near future, with a projected growth of eighteen million people "over the
next 25 years... in the coastal states of Florida, California, Texas, and
Washington" alone.9"
The problem of concentrated risk is perhaps most evident in
Florida, where some insurers have begun to reduce coverage or eliminate
service altogether. After a state regulator denied State Farm's proposed
47.1 percent average rate increase on home insurance premiums in 2009,
the company decided to pull out of the Florida property insurance mar-
ket.l°" Citing its "'substantially weakened financial position' related to its
inability to obtain approval of 'what it believes to be adequate property
insurance rates,"' the state's second largest property insurer left more
than 1.2 million home and property owners to seek coverage elsewhere.'0
This is likely to place additional strains on the state insurance pool and
catastrophe fund, which are already under heavy financial burdens. 1 2
The federal government is not heavily involved with insurance is-
sues; insurance is primarily a state-regulated industry.13 In recent years,
however, interest groups and Congress have attempted to increase fed-
eral oversight of the industry."°4 In 2008, Congressman Paul Kanjorski of
Pennsylvania introduced the Insurance Information Act of 2008, which
would establish an Office of Insurance Information ("OH") in the Depart-
Florida coastal counties despite higher insurance premiums).
99 NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., COASTAL: THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES
OF CLIMATE CHANGE 6 (2001), available at http://www.cop.noaa.gov/pubs/das/das2l.pdf.
" Daniel Hays, State Farm Pulls Out of Florida Property Market, NAT'L UNDERWRITER
PROP. & CASUALTY, Jan. 27, 2009, available at http://www.property-casualty.com/News/
2009/1/Pages/State-Farm-Pulls-Out-Of-Florida-Property-Market.aspx.
101 Id.
102 Michael Grunwald, Could Florida Survive the Big One?, TIME, Sept. 5, 2008, available
at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1839219,00.html.
10' Mark Boozell, Future of the Business Disciplines, Regulation and Oversight of the U.S.
Insurance Marketplace: The EvolvingArgumentsAround FederalizingInsurance Regulation,
PROF. INS. AGENTS INS. FOUND., August 2009, available at http://www.pianet.com/docd
FutureOfRegulation.pdf.
'O4 See, e.g., Arthur D. Postal, Financial Services Roundtable Pitches Proposal for Federal
Insurance Regulation: Minority within TARP Oversight Panel also Pushes for Regulatory
Consolidation, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, Feb. 9, 2009, available at http://
www.property-casualty.com/Issues/2009/5/Pages/Financial-Services-Roundtable-Pitches
-Proposal-For-Federal-Insurance-Regulation.aspx (citing the proposed creation of an
"omnibus federal services regulator," which would also increase the power of the federal
government to oversee the insurance industry).
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ment of the Treasury. °5 Under the Act, one of the functions of the 011
would be "to advise the Secretary [of the Treasury] on major domestic and
international insurance policy issues, including matters that affect con-
sumers and insurers.""1 6 The bill never passed, but it was reintroduced
in May of 2009.107 The 2009 bill also directs the 011 to "serve as a liaison
between the Federal Government and the individual and several States
regarding insurance matters of national importance and international
importance."' '
Meanwhile, the National Insurance Consumer Protection Act of
2009, introduced in the House by Rep. Melissa Bean, would create an
Office of National Insurance ("ONI') in the Department of the Treasury.0 9
Appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, the National
Insurance Commissioner would be the head of the ONI" and would be
charged with "oversee[ing] the organization, incorporation, operation,
regulation, and supervision of national insurers and national insurance
agencies." ' The ONI would also have the authority to obtain "prompt and
reasonable access to officers, employees, agents, books, records, and docu-
ments of such insurer or agency."'12 Such sweeping access to non-public
information would give the federal government greater insight into the
industry and allow for an enhanced examination into the effectiveness
of current state regulations. Furthermore, it may also lead to increased
federal regulation of the industry.
A. Lack of Disclosure Thus Far
Insurance companies have been hesitant to publicly provide infor-
mation regarding the financial risks of climate change. Friends of the
Earth, an international environmental network composed of seventy-seven
105 Insurance Information Act of 2008, H.R. 5840, 110th Cong. § 313 (2007).
106 Id. § 313(c) (2).
"07 Sara Hansard, Insurance Information Act of 2009, NARAB 11 Likely to Face Uphill
Battle in Senate, INVESTMENT NEWS, May 31, 2009, available at http://www.investmentnews
.comarticle/20090531REG/305319986 (noting the bill was "not taken up by the Senate.").
See Insurance Information Act of 2009, H.R. 2609, 111th Cong. (2009).
1o8 H.R. 2609 § 313(c) (1) (D).
109 National Insurance Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 1880, 111th Cong. § 101
(2009).
110 Id. § 101(b) (2).
'11 Id. § 102(a) (1).112 Id. § 201(c) (1).
296 [Vol. 34:281
CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE
national member groups, 113 reviewed the 2004 SEC filings of all one hun-
dred six publicly-traded insurance companies and found that just five com-
panies discussed the impacts of climate change in their annual reports.114
Compared to other sectors, the insurance industry lags far behind in the
level of disclosure provided to investors." 5 However, a 2009 survey of
twenty-seven insurers, conducted by Ceres, found that nine had some
level of climate change disclosure in their SEC filings,"6 signifying slow,
but gradual improvement.
It is doubtful that insurers are failing to disclose due to a total lack
of information on climate change. In fact, many insurers have begun to
use forward-looking catastrophic risk models to assess areas of vulnera-
bility and analyze their financial risks.1' 7 These computer-based models
allow insurers to utilize information related to climate change when cal-
culating and managing risk."' Using multiple sources of scientific data,
historical events, and mathematical formulas, these sophisticated models
can predict the magnitude, frequency, intensity, and likely damage arising
from future catastrophic events."9 While most insurers utilize the services
of catastrophe modeling firms, some have even begun to create their own
catastrophe models. 2 °
Although there are uncertainties regarding the long-term effects
of climate change, risk models used by insurers do retain some degree of
reliability. Sarah Tran of Georgetown University Law Center explains that
despite the inability of risk models to precisely determine when a major
weather event will transpire, such models allow insurers to assess the
likely amount of loss if such an event does occur.' 2 ' Additionally, forward-
... Friends of the Earth International, Who We Are, http://www.foei.org/en/who-we-are
(last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
114 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, CLIMATE RISK REPORTING IN SEC FILING OF PUBLICLY-TRADED
PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURERS 1 (2005), available at http://www.climate-insurance.org/
upload/pdf/FriendsoftheEarth2005_ClimateRiskReporting casualtyand-property
_insurers.pdf.
11' CERES CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE REPORT, supra note 11, at v.
116 Id. at 32.
'7 Derivative Solutions Provides Software to Insurance Companies to Calculate Standard
& Poor's RBC and FPC Models; Software Calculates Risk Exposure for Insurance
Companies, Bus. WIRE, Dec. 11, 2003, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/banking
-finance/financial-markets-investing-securities/5789936-1.html.
118 GAO INSURER REPORT, supra note 84, at 5.
", CATASTROPHE EXPOSURES, supra note 90, at 8-9, C-1 to C-3.
120 GAO INSURER REPORT, supra note 84, at 30 n.34.
121 Sarah M. Tran, Updated Hurricane Models: A New Opportunity to Insure Against
Climate Change, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 73, 102 (2008).
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looking models are more accurate than the traditional approach, which
assesses rates based on historical loss. 1
22
Some insurance regulators are skeptical about the use of catas-
trophe models due to a concern that such models would cause unjustifi-
ably high insurance rates. 23 Others, however, have begun to allow greater
use of these models for rate-setting purposes. In 2006, for example, the
Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner authorized a residual market in-
surer to exceed the statutory insurance rate cap after allowing the insurer
to use rate setting models to more accurately reflect risk.124
Following the 2005 hurricane season, Risk Management Solutions,
a risk modeling company that provides services to over four hundred in-
surers and other financial institutions, also adjusted its models and pre-
dicted a forty percent rise in insurance loss estimates across the Gulf Coast,
Florida, and the Southeast.'25 Given the fact that many of these forward-
looking models represent a higher probability of hurricanes making land-
fall than long-term historical data reflects, it is not surprising that this has
led to higher premium rates for consumers in those regions.
12
B. NAIC's Progress in Increasing Disclosure: Balancing Competing
Views
Despite reluctance on the part of insurers to disclose financial risks
due to climate change, regulators have made progress towards achieving
transparency. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners
("NAIC"), an organization of state insurance regulators created to ensure
solvency within the industry,'27 recently created the Climate Change and
Global Warming (EX) Task Force to analyze "the impact of climate change
on insurance consumers, insurance providers and insurance regulators...
[and to] examine the implications of climate change on insurer solvency,
the availability of affordable insurance coverage for the nation's insurance
consumers and its impact on insurance regulation."'25 Over the objections
122 Id. at 75.
12314d.
124 Mass. Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass'n Rate Filings, No. R2005-14, at 18,21 (Mass. Div.
Ins. June 30,2006) (decision and order), available at http://www.mass.gov/Eoca/docs//doi/
LegalHearingsR2005-14.pdf. See also Tran, supra note 121, at 75-76.
125 Insurance Risk Models Rise with Elevated Storm Frequency, Severity, ENV'T NEWS
SERVICE, Apr. 13, 2006, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/apr2006/2006-04-13-05.asp.
1 2 6 
Id.
127 KENNETH ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 108-09 (4th ed. 2005).
128 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Climate Change and Global Warming
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of insurance industry representatives,'29 the task force adopted a white
paper in June 2008 entitled The Potential Impact of Climate Change on
Insurance Regulation.3 ' The white paper described the potential effects
of climate change on the solvency of the insurance industry and called for
increased regulation to mitigate its consequences.' It also discussed the
potential for insolvency that the insurance industry faces as a result of
climate change,'32 calling for regulators to work together to "develop new
solvency regulatory tools to meet the challenges of climate change."'33 The
report concluded with a call for action by stating that "[t]he issue of
disclosure deserves immediate attention by insurance regulators."'34
1. Insurance Industry Concerns
At approximately the same time that the Climate Change and
Global Warming Task Force was adopting its white paper, it was also de-
veloping a "Climate Risk Disclosure Proposal," which, if passed, would
require insurance companies to disclose details to regulators, and to the
public, related to their financial risks from climate change.'35 When the
(EX) Task Force, http://www.naic.orglcommittees-ex chmate.htm (last visited Nov. 5,2009).29 ClimateandInsurance.org, Disclosure, http://www.climateandinsurance.org/disclosure
.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).
130 Press Release, Natl Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, Climate Change Study Focuses on Insurance
Impact (June 2,2008), http://www.naic.org/Releases/2008 docs/climate-study.html. See also
NAT'LASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON INSURANCE
REGULATION: DRAFT (Draft May 28, 2008), available at http://dnr.wi.gov/environment
protectlgtfgw/documents/NAIC20080530.pdf [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE WHITE PAPER].
131 CLIMATE CHANGE WHITE PAPER, supra note 130, at 3.
132 Id. at 1-2.
133 Id. at 3.
134 Id. at 15.
135 See NAT'LASS'NOFINS. COMM'RS, CLIMATE RISKDISCLOSURE PROPOSAL: SEcOND DRAFt
(Draft May 28, 2008) [hereinafter NAIC PROPOSAL SECOND DRAFT] (on file with author).
NAIC later sent out a third draft of the proposal. NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS,
CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE PROPOSAL: THIRD DRAFT (Draft Aug. 15, 2008), available at
http://states.naic.org/documents/committees exclimate_riskdisclosure_080815_draft.pdf
[hereinafter NAIC PROPOSAL THIRD DRAFT]. The two proposals, however, are substantively
similar and garnered similar complaints. Compare NAIC PROPOSAL SECOND DRAFT, supra
note 135, with NAIC PROPOSAL THIRD DRAFT, supra note 135 (proposals asked companies
to disclose information on the same topics). Proposed disclosure requirements included:
revealing whether the company has altered its investment strategy after considering the
impact of climate change and global warming on its investment portfolio, steps the company
has taken to encourage policyholders to mitigate losses due to climate change, a description
of the company's use of computer models to assess climate change impacts, any known
climate change trends that might have a material effect on the company's financial con-
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
proposal was opened for public comment by insurers and public interest
groups, there were significant concerns from both sides.
Most insurance companies were adverse to the NAIC's proposal for
increased disclosure requirements.136 Some argued that it is unreasonable
to ask an insurance provider to produce quantifiable information related
to the impact of climate change on their operations when scientific infor-
mation on the subject continues to evolve.137 Others shared concerns over
uncertainty related to how an insurer would translate long-term climate
change trends into predictions about risk from extreme weather and ad-
verse health conditions."'8 Skepticism also remains regarding how valuable
the information provided would even be. Even though the aforementioned
energy companies recently reached an agreement with New York Attorney
General Andrew Cuomo to disclose financial risks due to climate change,
some believe that the disclosures are likely to be vague "because it's im-
possible to know exactly what will happen in the future-not just what
laws and regulations might be enacted but how the earth's climate might
actually change." '139
dition, geographic locations where the company has increased rates or limited sales due
to climate change effects, how climate change might affect future liquidity and capital
needs, and any steps the company has taken to engage key constituencies on the issue of
climate change. NAIC PROPOSAL SECOND DRAFT, supra note 135, at 1-2; NAIC PROPOSAL
THIRD DRAFT, supra note 135, at 2-3.
.
36 See, e.g., Letter from Andrew Melnyk, Ph.D, Managing Director, Research, Am. Council
of Life Insurers, to Sean Dilweg, Chairman, Climate Change and Global Warming (EX)
Task Force (Sept. 15,2008), available at http://www.climateandinsurance.org/news/080303
_ACLI.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Andrew Melnyk] ("[T]here is still uncertainty regard-
ing the implications of climate change on catastrophic weather-related events in specific
regions of the world.").
137 Id.
138 See, e.g., Letter from Am. Ins. Ass'n, Natl Ass'n of Mutual Ins. Co.'s, and Prop. Casualty
Insurers Ass'n of Am., to Sean Dilweg, Chairman, Climate Change and Global Warming
(EX) Task Force (Sept. 15,2008), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees
_ex_climateriskdisclosure_080815_comments-ahip-etal.pdf [hereinafter Letter from
Insurance Groups]; see also Letter from Charles M. Feinen, Counsel, State Farm Mutual
Auto. Ins. Co., to Sean Dilweg, Chairman, Climate Change and Global Warming (EX) Task
Force (June 30,2008), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committeesex_climate
-riskdisclosure_080630_commentsState_Farm.pdf ("[T]he ramifications of.. .climate
change are unknown and will not result in an immediate and sudden impact like the
risks.., insured by the insurance industry.").
' Amy Miller, Power Companies Reveal Climate Change Financial Risks, TEX. LAW.,
Jan. 12, 2009.
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Some insurers were particularly concerned with how investors
would react if financial risk information were to be released.14 ° The in-
surance companies feared that the sensitive material may be misused,
because there are no governing rules directed at protecting the company's
interests.' Specifically, some companies were concerned that "[p]ublicly
traded companies disclosing forward-looking information in their SEC
filings are given statutory immunity from private lawsuits for good-faith,
forward-looking disclosures, but it is not clear that the individual states
have comparable laws to immunize the insurance industry for the forward-
looking statements the Proposal would require."'42
Insurers are also concerned about the release of proprietary informa-
tion through required disclosure. In a letter to the chairman of the Climate
Change and Global Warming (EX) Task Force, Travelers Companies, Inc.
expressed concern that requiring disclosure of "geographic locations or
specific perils 'for which the company has increased rates' could be read
to mandate disclosure of highly-sensitive, competitive information."'43 The
release of proprietary information and trade secrets may also have anti-
competitive effects on the industry, thereby decreasing the incentives of
insurers to innovate.' In certain instances, companies are required to
disclose information to regulators and government agencies but are given
assurances that the information will remain confidential.'45 However, some
insurance industry representatives remain apprehensive that such a stan-
dard for climate disclosure would be effective due to the possibility that
"various freedom of information acts and similar laws may significantly
limit the ability of regulators to maintain the confidentiality of data and
other information."'46 Furthermore, despite assurances by regulators
regarding confidentiality, courts retain the ultimate authority to decide
whether information provided must be released to the public.
147
141 See id.
141 Letter from Insurance Groups, supra note 138.
142 Id.
143 Letter from Gary L. Smith, Sr. Vice President of Gov't Relations, The Travelers
Companies, Inc., to Sean Dilweg, Chairman, Climate Change and Global Warming (EX)
Task Force (Sept. 15, 2008) (on file with author).
'44 Letter from David Snyder, Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, Am. Ins. Ass'n,
to Mr. Eric Nordman, Director of Research, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Commissioners (Sept. 15,
2008) [hereinafter Letter from David Synder] (on file with author); Letter from Andrew
Melnyk, supra note 136.
14' Letter from Insurance Groups, supra note 138.
146d.
147Id.
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If investors become aware of the risk insurers are taking on, they
may decide to invest elsewhere. To prevent this, insurers may opt to re-
duce their liability exposure, ultimately leading to a lack of coverage avail-
able to consumers."4 State pools offering insurance policies to those unable
to obtain coverage in the private market-designed to be a last resort for
consumers unable to obtain private insurance-needed a $715 million bail-
out from the legislature in order to cover their losses from the 2004 and
2005 hurricane seasons.1 49 A prolonged lack of coverage would place an
even greater burden on the residual markets.1 51 Ironically, states might
then have an incentive to favor very limited disclosure of financial risk.
Meanwhile, if insurance becomes too cost prohibitive, many property
owners may ultimately choose to take the risk and suffer severe conse-
quences if a catastrophe occurs. If the government then steps in to bail
them out, this may create a moral hazard as well.'51
In addition to the potential for increased claims as a result of the
frequency of climate-change related events, insurance companies may face
a possible increase in litigation resulting from disclosure.15 With limited
exceptions, insurance companies are still required to pay for defense costs
whether or not a plaintiff is successful in a lawsuit.53 In one sense, the in-
creased premium costs for high-level emitters of greenhouse gases provide
an incentive to such companies to reduce their emissions. 5 4 Neverthe-
less, liability for the effects of climate change is still a relatively new legal
theory, and it is difficult for insurers to accurately predict potential expo-
148 Sean B. Hecht, Climate Change and the Transformation of Risk: Insurance Matters,
55 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1581 (2008).
149 Chris Holly, Report: Record Losses Prompt Insurers to Address Global Warming Risks,
ENERGY DAiLY, Aug. 24, 2006.
150 See, e.g., Holbrook Mohr, Dale Mulls 397.8 Percent Insurance Hike for Coastal Residents-
Wind Pool' Says it Needs Funds to Re-insure Members, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, June 6,
2006 (discussing Mississippi's program that provides insurance for property that traditional
companies won't cover).
"' See Hurricane Katrina: Important Policy Questions Amid the Devastation and Recovery,
KNOWLEDGB@WHARTON, Jan. 25,2006, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm
?articleid=1364 (discussing the moral hazard problems associated with Hurricane Katrina).152 See, e.g., Leslie Eaton & Joseph Treaster, Insurance Woes for Hurricane Katrina Victims,
INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Sept. 2, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/O2lbusiness/world
business/02iht-orleans.4.7353442.html (discussing the fact that despite insurance com-
panies paying out $11 billion in claims to Louisiana residents in the two years following
Hurricane Katrina, there were sixty-six hundred insurance-related lawsuits that were
filed in federal district courts).153 ABRAHAM, supra note 127, at 588.
154 Hecht, supra note 148, at 1597.
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sure to litigation.155 The insurance industry already handles the largest
annual amount of lawsuits amongst all sectors in the United States, aver-
aging approximately seventeen hundred per year.156 In 2005 alone, the
average insurer in the United States incurred defense costs of approxi-
mately $36 million.157 Increased exposure to litigation related to climate
change will likely increase total liabilities. Consequently, speculative, and
potentially inaccurate, disclosures may result in increased litigation and
financial harm to insurers.55
Litigation over the revelation of trade secrets may become a factor
as well. The American Insurance Association ("AIA") expressed concern
that "an avalanche of litigation that could threaten the solvency of report-
ing insurers" could also arise as a result of the disclosure of proprietary
and sensitive information that would have an adverse impact on insurers,
insureds, and investors. 59
2. Concerns of Consumers, Public Interest Groups, and Investors
Consumer groups were more receptive to the idea of increased dis-
closure. Some explained that by requiring insurance companies to pro-
vide detailed responses, insurers would in turn examine more fully the
potential liabilities they face and take steps to address these risks. 60 With
additional information regarding the risk insurers face, both investors and
consumers will be better informed when making an investment or pur-
166 Id. at 1598.
[M]any liability theories are untested in courts, making it difficult to
assess the scope or magnitude of potential liability. Not only does this
inhibit an insurer's ability to accurately price a policy, but it also pre-
vents the insurer from being able to provide accurate financial infor-
mation to shareholders regarding the impact of climate change on their
financial situation.
Id.
156 Christina Ross, Evan Mills, & Sean B. Hecht, Limiting Liability in the Greenhouse:
Insurance Risk-Management Strategies in the Context of Global Climate Change, 26 A
STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 251,259(2007) (citing Meg Green, Study: Insurers Facing More Lawsuits
than Any Other Sector, BEsr's REv., Jan. 1, 2007, at 74) [hereinafter Limiting Liability
in the Greenhouse].
157 Id.
'5' Letter from David Snyder, supra note 144.
159 Id.
'" Letter from Consumer and Envtl. Org., to Sean Dilweg, Chairman, Climate Change
and Global Warming (EX) Task Force (Sept. 9, 2008).
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chasing coverage. 161 Furthermore, advocates for disclosure argued that
insurers are in the business of calculating the cost and nature of risks and
messaging the public about risk concerns,16 2 insisting that information
regarding the financial risk companies face due to climate change will send
a clear message to those whose locations or activities are very risky, there-
by encouraging them to locate in other areas or take steps to mitigate the
risk. 1 63 Although some consumer groups were initially against the pro-
posal because they felt it didn't mandate enough disclosure, a compromise
was ultimately reached after they agreed to the removal of a provision
that would have required top executives to attest to the accuracy of such
information and include it as part of their annual statements.
16 4
C. Adoption of Climate Risk Disclosure Survey
The NAIC has made significant progress with insurers towards
developing a comprehensive agreement that satisfies the concerns of both
insurers and investors. In February 2009, after a compromise was reached
between industry groups and consumer advocacy organizations," members
of the NAIC's Climate Change and Global Warming Task Force voted in
favor of the revised "Climate Risk Disclosure Survey," thereby requiring
insurers to disclose information regarding the financial impacts of climate
change and how their company is addressing these challenges. 66
The survey, which implements the draft from December 12, 2008,
asks the following eight questions:
161 Id.
162 Insurers Try to Calculate Risks of Climate Change (NPR radio broadcast Jan. 22,
2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=18288195.
163 Id.
' Meg Fletcher, NAIC Requires Disclosure of Climate Change Risks, BUS. INS., Mar. 22,
2009, available at httpJ/www.businessinsurance.com/article/20090322/ISSUEO1/100027351.
165 Id.
" Phil Gusman, NAIC Task Force Adopts Climate Change Survey to Help Assess Impact
on Insurers, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, Mar. 2, 2009, at 16, 16, available
at http/www.property-casualty.com/Issues/2009/8/Pages/NAIC-Task-Force-Adopts-Climate
-Change-Survey-To-Help-Assess-Impact-On-Insurers.aspx. See NAT'L ASS'N OF INS.
COMM'RS, INSURER CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE SURVEY (2008), available at http://www
.naic.org/documents/committees ex-climateclimateriskdisclosure-survey.pdf
[hereinafter INSURER CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE SURVEY].
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1. Does the company have a plan to assess, reduce or
mitigate its emissions in its operations or organi-
zations? If yes, please summarize.
2. Does the company have a climate change policy
with respect to risk management and investment
management? If yes, please summarize. If no, how
do you account for climate change in your risk
management?
3. Describe your company's process for identifying
climate change-related risks and assessing the de-
gree that they could affect your business, including
financial implications.
4. Summarize the current or anticipated risks that
climate change poses to your company. Explain the
ways that these risks could affect your business.
Include identification of the geographical areas af-
fected by these risks.
5. Has the company considered the impact of climate
change on its investment portfolio? Has it altered
its investment strategy in response to these consid-
erations? If so, please summarize steps you have
taken.
6. Summarize steps the company has taken to en-
courage policyholders to reduce the losses caused
by climate change-influenced events.
7. Discuss steps, if any, the company has taken to
engage key constituencies on the topic of climate
change.
8. Describe actions your company is taking to man-
age the risks climate change poses to your business
including, in general terms, the use of computer
modeling.167
Designed "to provide regulators, shareholders and the public with
substantive information about the risks posed by climate change to in-
surers and the actions insurers are taking in response to their under-
167 Gusman, supra note 166, at 16.
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standing of climate change risks,"'68 the survey requires insurers with
annual premiums greater than or equal to $500 million to annually sub-
mit the Insurer Climate Risk Disclosure Survey to the company's domi-
cile state.'69 On March 17, 2009, the survey was officially adopted by the
NAIC executive committee. 7 ' Given the fact that the NAIC is a third-
party non-governmental organization lacking the power to adopt binding
rules, however, the survey is subject to approval by the states on an indi-
vidual basis, and it is unclear how many states will opt to require their
insurance companies to submit the survey.' 7 '
D. Benefits of Disclosure
Many insurance companies fail to realize the benefits that may be
derived from providing the public with information regarding their finan-
cial exposure to climate change. Some companies are using the issue of
climate change to obtain a competitive advantage and provide increased
business opportunities. 172 By assessing and subsequently minimizing the
potential exposure of a company's assets to climate-change related risks,
a business can enhance its reputation for sustainability, which may sig-
nificantly impact an investor's propensity to become involved with the
company.
73
Swiss Re is perhaps the most well-known example of an insurer
utilizing climate change to its competitive advantage. In 1989, Swiss Re
characterized climate change as an "emerging risk," and has undertaken
significant measures to develop an appropriate and "effective response." '174
By 1991, the company had developed its own Internal Eco Team.175 In its
marketing brochures, Swiss Re states that its "actions are based on the
premise that it is in the interest of shareholders, clients and employees,
the wider stakeholder community and society in general to tackle this
168 Id.
169 Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, Insurance Regulators Adopt Climate Change
Risk Disclosure (Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.naic.org/Releases/20O9_docs/cimatechange
riskdisclosureadopted.htm.
Id.
171 Gusman, supra note 166, at 17.
172 Stephen Bernhut, Corporate Climate Change, CA MAG., Jan. 1, 2009.
173 Id.
174 Swiss RE, PIONEERING CLIMATE SOLUTIONS 3 (2008), available at http://www.swissre
.com/resources/40304f804aldfa2687d8d7leleec54e-Pioneering_climate_solutions.pdf.
175 Id.
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[climate change] issue."'76 Swiss Re also emphasizes its 'long-standing
tradition of sharing the results of its research with the public and other
stakeholders affected by climate change. By doing so, [it] intend[s] to help
society reduce risk and improve resilience, for instance through introduc-
ing smart regional planning and stringent building codes.""' By the end
of 2007, Swiss Re had invested over 600 million Swiss Francs, approxi-
mately 596 million USD, 78 in "green assets" and became the first insurer
ever to provide carbon insurance.'79
Some insurers are joining other financial institutions to coordi-
nate an effective group response towards climate change disclosure and
mitigation. In December of 2008, Swiss Re joined global financial institu-
tions Cr6dit Agricole, HSBC, Standard Chartered, and reinsurer Munich
Re to create The Climate Principles."w The group's objective is to "encour-
age retail banks to enable customers [to] take action to become climate
friendly and insurance institutions to inform clients on climate risks and
mitigation technologies."'' It will also work to coordinate responses to
developing climate change issues while pushing for increased transpar-
ency. '2 Munich Re has been actively involved in addressing climate change
in other areas as well. The company recently submitted a proposal at a
United Nations climate change summit calling for the creation of a mech-
anism to assist poor people in adapting to climate change risks.'83
1. Insurance Companies Can Mitigate Loss Resulting from
Climate Change
There are numerous steps that insurance companies can take to
mitigate risks stemming from the effects of climate change. First, the in-
surance industry, in conjunction with the NAIC, should work with state
legislatures to provide incentives for homeowners, businesses, and other
insurers to mitigate the effects of climate change.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 9.
178 See Xe.com, Currency Converter, http://www.xe.com/ucc (last visited Nov. 5, 2009)
(calculated six hundred million Swiss Francs into USD).
179 SwIss RE, supra note 174, at 11-12.
1
" Global Finance Leaders Unveil New Climate Change Principles, Indian Express Finance,
Dec. 15, 2008, http://in.biz.yahoo.com/081214/203/6z709.html.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
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Some state legislatures have been very active in encouraging miti-
gation from climate change. Florida, for example, created the MySafe
Florida Home Grant Program in 2006 to encourage hurricane safety in-
spections and raise public awareness of the financial benefits of hurricane
awareness measures." The program provides a financial incentive by
offering grant awards of up to $10,000 for home mitigation projects, includ-
ing up to $5,000 from the state in matching funds.1 15 Meanwhile, South
Carolina's Omnibus Coastal Property Insurance Reform Act of 2007 cre-
ated a hurricane loss mitigation grant program similar to that of Florida.
Designed to provide financial assistance to homeowners for structural
improvements that would mitigate loss from major climatic events,87 the
South Carolina Safe Home Grant ("SCSH") program also provides up to
$10,000 in grant funds for specified mitigation improvements, $5,000 of
which the state can "match."' 8 The SCSH program has awarded over six
hundred grants since its establishment; most funding was targeted to-
ward the regions of the state most vulnerable to the effects of climate
change."8 ' Additionally, the state allocates grants to municipalities for the
development of mitigation strategies and enforcement of building code
regulations. 9 °
Tax incentives may provide additional incentives for mitigation.
South Carolina, for example, provides three types of tax credits for costs
associated with mitigation activities and insurance purchases. 191 The first
implements a tax credit for retrofitting houses to make them more resis-
tant to catastrophic events, such as hurricanes. 9 2 The second provides
a credit for the sales taxes spent on the purchase of the above-mentioned
retrofitting equipment.'93 Lastly, residents can receive a tax credit for
casualty insurance premiums that exceed five percent of their annual
18 My Safe Florida Home, About the Program, http://www.mysafefloridahome.com/
abouttheprogram.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
'85 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.5586(2) (b) (West Supp. 2009).
"' Elisabeth A. Ondera, Testing the Waters: The South Carolina Coastal Captive Insurance
Act as Part of a Multifaceted Approach to the Coastal Insurance Conundrum, 59 S.C. L.
REv. 599, 599, 605 n.72 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-75-485 (2008).
187 § 38-75-485(C).
188 § 38-75-485(C) (b).
"
8 SC Safe Home, About SC Safe Home, http://www.scsafehome.sc.gov/About/ (last visited
Nov. 11, 2009).
190 S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-75-480 (2008).
91 See Ondera, supra note 186, at 604-05.
'92 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-3660(A)-(B) (2008).
193 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-3665 (2008).
[Vol. 34:281308
CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE
adjusted gross income. 194These financial incentives encourage those who
might not otherwise look into mitigation techniques and green building
options to further explore these possibilities.
Insurers have become more involved with the promotion of
green building projects as well.'95 AIG, for example, has established AIG
Environmental, a green building program designed to offer premium dis-
counts of up to ten percent for properties which have received certifica-
tion by the United States Green Building Council's Leadership in Energy
and Environmental Design ("LEED") rating system.'96 Other insurers
such as Zurich, Travelers, and Ace, have expanded their coverage plans
to offer "green" endorsements which would insure construction projects that
utilize LEED Green Building and Green Globe Assessment and Rating
System standards.'97 The companies also offer coverage for rebuilding of
properties to green certification levels. 9 '
III. ASSESSING THE PROPER LEVEL OF DISCLOSURE
Even if states require companies to disclose climate-related infor-
mation, the SEC is a separate and independent federal agency that retains
the right to require publicly-traded companies to report additional infor-
mation. 99 Given the unique concerns facing the insurance industry, how-
ever,2 it is imperative that the SEC exercises caution to avoid potentially
disastrous effects.
To protect insurance companies from additional litigation costs and
liabilities associated with inaccurate disclosure, the SEC should ensure
194 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-3670 (2008).
195 MARSH, THE GREEN BUILT ENVIRONMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008 YEAR-END
UPDATE OF THE STATE OF THE INSURANCE MARKET 1 (2008), available at http://www
.theburnscompanies.comdocuments/MARSHGreen_..Mkt_Rpt2_MA8-10211_1.09_5609
_000.pdf (noting "an increased interest among insurance companies in green building.").
' Id. at 5-6. See also U.S. Green Building Council: LEED, http://www.usgbc.org/leed
(last visited Nov. 11, 2009) (information about LEED standards).
197 MARSH, supra note 195, at 7-8.
I
98 d. at 8.
'99 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo
.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2009) ("Companies with more than $10 million in assets
whose securities are held by more than 500 owners must file annual and other periodic
reports.").
200 See supra Part II.
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that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act2 ' applies to any forward-
looking statements made by insurers related to climate change. The NAIC
has a similar and equally effective means of accomplishing this goal by in-
cluding specific language in the Climate Risk Disclosure Survey allowing
insurers who voluntarily disclose forward-looking information to "disclaim
any responsibility for the accuracy of such forward-looking information.""2 2
If an insurer provides forward-looking information in good faith, "it may
condition its response with a waiver of any claim under any theory of law
based on the inaccuracy of such information."0 ' Providing similar language
in future SEC regulations will alleviate some of the concerns associated
with providing forward-looking predictions that prove to be fallible.
As previously discussed, predicting litigation costs and potential
exposure resulting from climate change is an extremely difficult task.2 4 In-
surers should, therefore, be allowed to provide broad statements of poten-
tial risk without having to quantify the potential exposure. This will alert
investors to potential areas they should be concerned about without having
to rely on little more than a guess.20 5 To additionally address the concerns
of investors and consumer groups, insurers should be required to broadly
describe future strategies to deal with the problem. Such information does
not need to be quantitative, nor should companies be required to provide
a roadmap of their business plans. Investors should receive enough infor-
mation, however, to understand whether or not the company is taking the
problem seriously and how they are responding to the issue. This may
include statements of whether an insurer uses risk models or whether they
provide incentives for mitigation. This would allow the investor to make
an educated and informed decision about whether to invest or sell.
Although insurers should not be required to release proprietary
information to the public,20 6 such as that obtained from catastrophe risk
models, state regulators must still have access to enough confidential data
to exercise oversight and to ensure the solvency of a particular insurer
is not at risk. Thus, such confidential information must still be disclosed
201 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
202 INSURER CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE SURVEY, supra note 166, at 1.
203 id.
204 See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
2 1 In the instructions for the Climate Risk Disclosure Survey adopted by the NAIC, there
is a provision stating that an insurer is "not required to provide quantitative information."
INSURER CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE SURVEY, supra note 166, at 1.2 0 Many insurance companies were initially concerned that proprietary information would
be released in the disclosure. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
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to regulators, allowing them to maintain proper oversight while protect-
ing proprietary information." 7
State regulators must also identify and aggressively pressure
companies that are engaging in unsafe coverage practices to alter their
behavior. The idea that a company is "too big to fail 208 is no longer an
excuse to avoid oversight and regulation. Insurers that continue to write
a disproportionately high amount of policies in areas heavily prone to
climate change must justify their decisions to regulators and demonstrate
their ability to remain solvent following a climatic event. If a company is
overly engaged in risky behavior, the public has a right to be informed.
Safe harbor statutes, however, must be adequately developed to prevent
the public release of sensitive information that may inhibit competition.
Most importantly, insurers, regulators, policymakers, and the gen-
eral public cannot ignore the perils the insurance industry faces due to cli-
mate change. Prior to the onset of the current financial crisis, there were
many warnings that risky practices by banks and other financial institu-
tions were susceptible to detrimental effects.20 9 Many of these warnings,
however, went unheeded, even at the highest levels of government.210 If
insurers can demonstrate to regulators that their risk models-or other
sources of information and data-indicate that premiums need to be raised
in order to sustain the amount of coverage provided to a particular region,
then regulators need to allow for such adjustments. Meanwhile, those
moving to areas most vulnerable to climate change must also accept the
realities and costs associated with such a move. For example, the Florida
coastline is home to many high-value properties;21' it is essential that in-
07Obviously, it would be essential for the regulators to keep the information confidential
to allay the fears of some companies. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
208 Catherine Rampell, Defining "Too Big to Fail,'N.Y. TIMES ECONoMix BLOG (Aug. 20,
2009, 5:08 PM), available at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/defining-too
-big-to-fail/ (discussing what it means to be "too big to fail .... ").
209 See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Loose Reins on Galloping Loans; Efforts to Regulate
Risky Mortgage Innovations Are So Far Ignored, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2005 (discussing
how regulators were ignoring the risk of certain types of mortgages); Katie Benner, Chanos:
G 7 Ignored Crisis Warning, CNNMONEY, Aug. 26, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/08/
26/news/international/chanos-warning-g7.frtune/index.htm?postversion=2009O82612
(discussing how a hedge fund manager warned the G7 finance ministers in 2007 of the
eventual systematic banking failure).
210 Bush Administration Ignored Warnings of Pending Financial Meltdown, Fox NEWS,
Dec. 1, 2008, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,460044,00.html.
211 FLA. ATL. UNIV., FLORIDA'S RESILIENT COASTS, A STATE POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 9 (2007), available at http://www.flclimatechange.us/
ewebeditpro/items/O12F17808.pdf.
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surance premiums reflect the risks associated with owning property in an
area so susceptible to climate-induced catastrophes.212 Accurate information
regarding the risk of such properties, combined with appropriate insur-
ance premiums to reflect that risk, may ultimately reduce the projected
population growth in areas most affected by climate change.
Climate change is just one of the many issues affecting the insur-
ance industry on a national scale. Although the establishment of the Office
of Insurance Information was unsuccessful in the past, many in Congress
are still pushing for a federal office to regulate national insurers in each
state.213 A federal official with knowledge of the insurance industry may
be effective in assuring that the unique concerns of the industry and its
relationship with climate change are properly addressed. Given the fact
that many insurance companies provide coverage in multiple states, such
an official would be able to provide valuable insight for establishing mini-
mum standards of nationwide disclosure to promote greater uniformity in
the means of addressing the issue.
Insurers should also be required to provide information regarding
current risks related to climate change and how the company is dealing
with these risks. Although this need not require quantitative data, inves-
tors are very wary of undisclosed risks and deserve to know whether their
company is addressing an issue that has the potential to have catastrophic
consequences. 21 4 This will provide a strong incentive for insurers to take
climate change more seriously.
Insurers should adopt a more proactive approach to addressing
climate change in other ways as well. Promotion and implementation of
mitigation techniques and green building initiatives will help alleviate an
insurer's risk and ease the effects of climate change while providing incen-
tives for insureds to mitigate their own risk." 5 While budget constraints
may vary the types and amounts of aid states can offer through grant
programs and tax credits, mitigation programs provide an incentive for
both property owners and insurers to reduce the potential effects of cli-
mate change, thereby increasing the likelihood that an insurer will remain
212See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (discussing Florida's coastline and the
concentrated risk problem in such a vulnerable area).
213 Arthur D. Postal, Optional Federal Charter Momentum Builds, Especially for Life
Insurers, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CAsuALTY, Mar. 16, 2009. See also supra notes
104-12 (discussing the Insurance Information Acts).
214 Limiting Liability in the Greenhouse, supra note 156, at 264.
215 See supra Part II.D.1.
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willing to write coverage in higher risk areas.216 Ultimately, this may have
the effect of reducing the insurer's financial exposure to the effects of cli-
mate change while increasing the willingness on the part of an investor
to purchase stock in the company.
CONCLUSION
The current state of the economy, the overwhelming popular
distrust of corporate America, and increasing concern over changes in the
environment have led many investors and consumer groups to demand
increased information regarding the financial effects of climate change
on publicly traded companies. Recent efforts have been successful in re-
quiring energy companies such as Xcel and Dynegy to disclose such in-
formation which financially impacts their operations.217 While the SEC has
not yet taken action to address climate change disclosure through public
reporting,218 Congress-in addition to citizen groups-continues to put
pressure on an agency already beleaguered by public outcry over its lack
of oversight and enforcement. All of these factors have created a "perfect
storm" for increased climate change reporting requirements.
The NAIC's recent adoption of the Climate Risk Disclosure Survey
demonstrates that the insurance industry has not gone unnoticed in the
movement toward greater transparency. Although the survey does not
require insurers to disclose climate change information on their financial
statements and the states retain the authority to choose whether or not
to administer it,219 this development is not insignificant. Given the move
toward increased disclosure, most states will likely adopt the survey in
one form or another, causing many insurers to disclose information they
otherwise would have preferred to be kept secret.
If the SEC adopts increased climate change reporting requirements,
publicly-traded insurance companies will be significantly affected. It is
very important that the SEC understand that the unique characteristics
of the insurance industry create an enhanced risk that the dissemination
of climate change information, particularly associated with proprietary
data, may significantly impact premiums, availability of coverage, and
216 See Ondera, supra note 186, at 603 (describing South Carolina's Coastal Captive
Insurance Act's intention to make the state "a more attractive place to write policies.").
See also supra Part II.D.1 (discussing mitigation programs).
217 See supra notes 71-76.
211 See supra Part L.A and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 169-71.
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even solvency. It is vital, nevertheless, that the public become aware of the
risks insurers face in order to play an active role in the mitigation of such
risk. Through carefully-tailored disclosure requirements that provide
enough information for an investor to make an informed decision while
encouraging insurers to address climate change in a meaningful and prac-
tical way, the public will have greater confidence in the industry, sensitive
information will be protected, and insurers will be able to remain solvent.
